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I. INTRODUCTION
Much recent scholarship focuses on the problems posed by
uncertainty regarding intellectual property rights. In patent
law, which is the focus of this Article,' this uncertainty relates
primarily to the scope and validity of patents.2 Uncertainty
regarding scope and validity plays an important role in
litigation decisions. With assessment of the likelihood of
litigation success difficult and the cost of defending a patent
infringement suit high, alleged infringers may choose to settle
or to cease the allegedly infringing conduct, even if litigation
would ultimately show that the challenged conduct was
permissible.
In some patent cases, however, and particularly in some
patent-antitrust cases, uncertainty plays a more fundamental
role. In these cases, including cases involving Hatch-Waxman
pharmaceutical settlements and deception in the standard-
setting process, the patentee gains its competitive advantage not
just from its exclusive control over its patent, or even from the
cost of litigating the patent, but directly from the unavailability
of information about the patent. That is, much of the patentee's
power derives directly from the uncertainty, independent of
actual litigation of the patent. Nevertheless, courts typically
approach these cases as if they involved the same sorts of rights
to exclude as in typical infringement cases. This Article considers
1. Analogous issues are presented by copyright law. See David Fagundes, Crystals
in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139, 150-60 (2009); Steven J. Horowitz, Copyright's
Asymmetric Uncertainty, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 331, 335-54 (2012); David S. Olson, First
Amendment Based Copyright Misuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 537, 555-63 (2010); see also
Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 498-509,
516-20, 525-29 (2004) (comparing the two bodies of law).
2. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46-72 (2008) (scope); Mark A.
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 85-86 (2005)
(validity); Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS L.J.
61, 63-68 (2006) (scope); Lee Petherbridge, The Claim Construction Effect, 15 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 215, 220-21, 228-36 (2008) (scope); Michael Risch, The
Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 187-89 (2007)
(scope).
There are also calls for more disclosure of other "contextual" information about
patents. See Colleen Chien, Rethinking Patent Disclosure (May 12, 2012), available at
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/404/ ("Rather than focusing only on the content
of the patent, we need to keep in mind the context of the patent-for example, how many
times it's been cited, whether the patent is in force, whether it has international
counterparts, if it's been transferred, who owns it, whether it has been subject to
reexamination or marking, and how many continuations have been filed on it."); Irene
Troy & Raymund Werle, Uncertainty and the Market for Patents 10, 15-18 (Max Planck
Inst. for the Study of Soc'ys, Working Paper No. 08/2, 2008), available at
http://www.mpifg.de/pulworkpap/wp08-2.pdf.
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whether patentees are properly entitled to take advantage of
uncertainty regarding their patents.
Claims that patentees are using their patents to gain
advantages to which the patents do not entitle them are usually
made through the defense of patent misuse or through analogous
antitrust claims. The test in either case, at least as it has been
stated in recent years, is whether the challenged practice is
"reasonably within the patent grant, i.e., that it relates to subject
matter within the scope of the patent claims." As the reference to
"the scope of the patent claims" suggests, this test focuses on the
nature of the patentee's invention. Indeed, information about the
invention is central to the allegations in typical misuse cases.'
Although courts do not often actually refer in the cases to the
patents' claims,' they usually at least discuss the nature of the
patentees' inventions and compare them to the conduct at issue.
The cases that will be discussed here are different, in that
the inventions are almost irrelevant.' For example, in the
cases alleging failures to disclose patents before standard-
setting bodies and later use of patent rights to "hold up"
producers of the standardized products, there generally is no
dispute that the standardized products infringe the patents at
issue;' instead, the disputes center on the significance of the
patentees' failures to disclose the existence of their patents.
And in the cases regarding "reverse payment" settlements in
the pharmaceutical industry, although validity and
infringement are the underlying issues, the cases do not
actually involve any evaluation of the inventions, prior art, or
allegedly infringing products; instead, both the patentees and
the alleged infringers use settlement agreements to prevent
3. The standards applicable to the patent misuse defense and to analogous
antitrust claims have been similar.
4. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992). That is
the test, the Mallinckrodt court said, when the conduct does not involve per se violations,
like price-fixing or tying. Id.
5. See Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 670-71 n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
("The law of patent misuse in licensing ... need look only to the nature of the claimed
invention as the basis for determining whether a product is a necessary concomitant of
the invention or an entirely separate product.").
6. But see, e.g., Princo Corp. v. ITC, 563 F.3d 1301, 1309-10 n.7 (Fed. Cir.),
vacated, 583 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
7. See, e.g., Senza-Gel Corp., 803 F.2d at 667-68, 670 & n.14.
8. See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PENN. L.
REV. 1, 66 (2005) ("As patent portfolios become more prevalent, it will be increasingly
difficult to assess accurately the stand-alone value of individual patents.").
9. In fact, the Federal Circuit recently held that in some circumstances
infringement can be established by reference to an industry standard. See Fujitsu Ltd. v.
Netgear Inc., 620 F.3d 1321, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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litigation of those issues, preserving the uncertainty from
which they both benefit.
The purpose of this Article is twofold. First, it points out the
role played by uncertainty in three otherwise very different
categories of cases, involving "reverse payment" settlements,
patent portfolios and package licensing, and deception in
standard-setting. Each of these three types of cases has been
prominent recently. The source of the uncertainty in each of the
three is different, but in each the unavailable information is not
protected by patent law. In the reverse-payment cases, the
information concerns the validity of a patent on a pharmaceutical
product." In the portfolio cases, it concerns the existence and
relevance of a large number, sometimes tens of thousands, of
patents." And in the standard-setting cases, the information
concerns the existence of one or a few patents and their
application to a standard.12 In each type of case, the patentee,
sometimes in concert with a potential licensee, is able to use the
unavailability of the information to its advantage.
Second, the Article points out that in these cases the courts
nevertheless apply rules that are more appropriate for the
information about inventions that patent law is intended to
protect. Patent law grants patentees the exclusive right to make,
use, or sell their inventions, but it gives them no exclusive
control over information about the existence, validity, or other
characteristics of those patents. When cases turn not on the
technical information in patents, but on the availability of
"contextual" information about those patents," it is not clear that
the courts should be so willing to apply rules that favor patents
and patentees. For example, the presumption of validity may be
a valuable tool when allocating burdens of proof in actual validity
disputes. Yet it has also been applied in the "reverse payment"
cases, which challenge agreements that eliminate the possibility
of validity disputes. And the Federal Circuit has recently relied
on uncertainties in the law of claim construction and claim
interpretation to give patentees greater freedom in imposing
package license arrangements." These uncertainties may be
inherent in patent law, but they do nothing to promote
10. See infra Part III.A.
11. See infra Part IV.A.
12. See infra Part V.A.
13. See Chien, supra note 2 ("Making this information easier to access could also
yield an important ... additional benefit-solving the long-felt problem of how to identify
valuable patents.").
14. See Princo Corp. v. ITC, 563 F.3d 1301, 1312 (Fed. Cir.), vacated, 583 F.3d 1380
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
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innovation, so it is not clear that they should give patentees more
freedom, rather than less.
Before discussing the three types of cases on which this
Article focuses, the next section provides some background. First,
it outlines two previous articles, one by Lemley and Shapiro and
another by Parchomovsky and Wagner, that have addressed the
uncertainty issue from a perspective somewhat similar to that
here, though each article focused on only one of the three types of
cases discussed here. Second, it describes how the courts, and
particularly the Supreme Court, have previously considered the
problem of uncertainty in antitrust and patent law. The
subsequent sections then discuss the three types of cases,
explaining the central role played by the unavailability of
information about the patents at issue and describing how courts
apply rules that are not always appropriate in the context of that
uncertainty.
II. PATENTS AND UNCERTAINTY
A. Probabilistic Patents and Patent Portfolios
Several aspects of uncertainty regarding patents have been
the subject of recent articles. The articles address these issues
primarily from the perspective of current patent law and
antitrust law. That is, they consider how uncertainty of patent
protection affects results under current law, but for the most part
they do not draw a distinction between the two types of
information distinguished here: information in patents, which is
information about inventions, and information about patents.
The present Article builds on this work but focuses more on this
distinction and on whether information about patents should be
treated as protected information.
Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro have discussed what they
call "probabilistic patents," observing that although all property
rights are somewhat uncertain, "the uncertainty associated with
patents is especially striking, and indeed is fundamental to
understanding the effects of patents on innovation and
competition."" They identify two distinct types of uncertainty:
(1) uncertainty regarding the commercial value of patents; and
(2) uncertainty regarding patents' validity and scope, which
becomes particularly significant in patent litigation.' It is the
latter source of uncertainty with which this Article is primarily
15. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 76.
16. Id.
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concerned," though the standard-setting cases and portfolio cases
could be viewed as implicating the former as well.
For the most part, Lemley and Shapiro view what they call
"litigation uncertainty" as a problem to be solved by patent law."
They offer several suggestions to encourage challenges of
patents, which would lessen uncertainty, particularly
uncertainty about the validity of the patents. They also discuss
the possibility of anticompetitive settlements of patent claims in
the pharmaceutical industry that provide for delayed entry by
new entrants.o They compare these settlements, as recent cases
have done, to payments by the patentee to keep competitors out
of the market.2' Such agreements would generally be illegal
under antitrust law, but the law in the patent context is arguably
not so clear, as they suggest: "But is this same payment
anticompetitive in the context of a patent settlement? Does the
answer depend upon the strength of the patent?"22
Although Lemley and Shapiro treat the problem as one of
uncertainty and note that invalidation of a patent is a public
good, they do not address the problem primarily as an
informational one. Instead, they address the issue within the
framework of patent law:
[A] patent does not give its owner the right to exclude rivals
who are allegedly infringing, at least not without a court
order. Payments from patent holders to alleged infringers
in exchange for their agreement to stay off the market
therefore go beyond the patent grant and exclude allegedly
infringing competition, to the.detriment of consumers.
The present Article is in agreement with Lemley and
Shapiro's view that these settlement practices can, as they say,
"go beyond the patent grant," but it focuses more explicitly on
what this means and on how it relates to other patent-related
informational issues. The perspective advocated here, as will be
discussed further below, is not that an uncertain patent is being
treated as a certain one, though that too would be a
misapplication of patent law, but that the competitive advantage
produced by a private settlement that preserves the uncertainty
17. Much of the contextual information about patents that is discussed by Colleen
Chien would be of the first type. See Chien, supra note 2.
18. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 79-80, 85-87.
19. Id. at 85-90.
20. See id. at 91-95.
21. Id. at 91-93.
22. Id. at 92.
23. Id. at 93 (citation omitted).
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is "beyond the patent grant" in that it concerns information that
is not protected by patent law. Therefore, it should receive no
protection from patent law.24
Another patent information issue is addressed by Gideon
Parchomovsky and Polk Wagner, who consider patent portfolios.2 5
Their purpose is primarily to explain the "patent paradox," the
phenomenon that firms continue to seek patents-indeed,
increasingly seek patents-despite the fact that the average
value of individual patents has declined. 26 Their explanation is
that with patent portfolios, the whole is greater than the sum of
its parts. Indeed, they argue that in patent portfolios, the value
of individual patents is increasingly irrelevant.2 7 They describe
the possible negative effects of this circumstance, which include
increased complexity of patent litigation and advantages for
holders of large portfolios."
Parchomovsky and Wagner propose several responses,
mostly from within patent law. However, they also consider how
antitrust law might respond to the shift toward portfolios,
pointing to work by Daniel Rubinfeld and Robert Maness."
Rubinfeld and Maness address the uncertainty issue more
directly:
The patent thicket creates considerable uncertainty for
competitors about whether their technology infringes,
especially with respect to a hidden or submarine patent.
Even if a firm is not practicing submarine patents, a patent
thicket makes it hard to design and sell products without
running the risk of infringing on a competitor's patent. The
resulting uncertainty can allow a firm to threaten
infringement suits against competitors. One beneficial
outcome (perhaps for both firms, but not necessarily for the
public) is a cross licensing arrangement with a competitor.
... The uncertainty about the validity of each of the
patents in the patent thicket along with the potentially
24. The result of a legal challenge would then turn on whatever other legal grounds
might be available, independent of patent law. In the case of settlements, it would likely
be antitrust law; in the case of deception before standard-setting organizations, it could be
antitrust, contract law, equitable estoppel, or some other body of law.
25. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 8, at 27-41.
26. Id. at 12-19.
27. Id. at 66.
28. Id. at 63-65.
29. Id. at 71-74 (discussing Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Robert Maness, The Strategic
Use of Patents: Implications for Antitrust, in ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT: EU
AND US PERSPECTIVES 89-91 (Francois Idv~que & Howard A. Shelanski, eds. 2005)).
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substantial cost of litigation creates a strong incentive for
the competitor to accept a licensing arrangement. As
described previously, the license fee or royalty raises rivals'
costs, and in doing so, creates a strategic advantage."
There is not necessarily anything anticompetitive, of course,
with incentives to license, even if the license is to a patent portfolio
rather than to an individual patent. A problem can arise, however,
if the licensee is forced to take a license not so much as a means of
gaining access to patented technology but instead as a means of
avoiding uncertainty. It is not clear that the advantages conferred
by this uncertainty are properly viewed as the rights of patentees.
The uncertainty is not a product of innovation, so there is no clear
reason for patent law to play a role. Instead, as discussed below, it
could be that the costs created by the uncertainty, or at least any.
exacerbation of the uncertainty, should be viewed as the
responsibility of the patentees." At the very least, courts should not
use patent law, as the Federal Circuit has done, to provide
additional protections for patentees when a "patent thicket creates
considerable uncertainty for competitors about whether their
technology infringes.""
B. Uncertainty in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court, unlike the lower courts, has been quite
attentive to the costs of uncertainty, and more particularly to the
costs of allowing private parties to take advantage of it at the
expense of the public. The most prominent antitrust case on the
issue is National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States." In that case, an association of engineers adopted a canon
of ethics prohibiting competitive bidding." The Court held that
the ban on competitive bidding was anticompetitive, stating that
it "'impedes the ordinary give and take of the market place,' and
substantially deprives the customer of 'the ability to utilize and
compare prices in selecting engineering services."'
Although the Court in Professional Engineers did not
approach the case explicitly as an informational one, it is the
availability of information that makes possible the comparison of
prices to which the Court referred. Essentially, it is information
30. Rubinfeld & Maness, supra note 29, at 89.
31. See infra Parts III.A, V.A, and text accompanying notes 106-111.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 125-134.
33. Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
34. Id. at 681.
35. Id. at 692-93 (quoting United States v. Natl Soc'y Profl Eng'rs, 404 F. Supp.
457, 460 (D.D.C. 1975)).
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that underlies "the ordinary give and take of the market place."
Moreover, the Court did not accept the argument that the
association's ban was justified by the possibility that "competitive
bidding for engineering projects may be inherently imprecise and
incapable of taking into account all the variables which will be
involved in the actual performance of the project."" Competition,
the Court concluded, must be permitted to function regardless of
the costs it may impose"-imperfect information is better than
no information.
Professional Engineers involved price information, but the
Court later took a very similar approach to nonprice
information." In FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, the
defendant organization had adopted a policy under which its
member dentists would withhold X-rays from insurance
companies seeking to evaluate the dentists' services." The Court
cited Professional Engineers and condemned the dentists' policy:
A concerted and effective effort to withhold (or make more
costly) information desired by consumers for the purpose of
determining whether a particular purchase is cost justified
is likely enough to disrupt the proper functioning of the
price-setting mechanism of the market that it may be
condemned even absent proof that it resulted in higher
prices or, as here, the purchase of higher priced services,
than would occur in its absence.40
Both of these cases involved horizontal agreements, which
are generally viewed much more critically than are vertical
agreements or unilateral arrangements. Of the three types of
cases to be discussed below, only those involving pharmaceutical
settlements involve horizontal agreements. But the cases stand
for more than the legal rules applicable to concerted action. They
illustrate the Court's recognition that markets only work well
when information is available about the products offered on those
markets. Consequently, it seems unlikely that the Court would
36. Id. at 694.
37. See id. at 695-96.
38. In a more recent case, California Dental Association v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771-
72 (1999), the Court took the view that nonprice information can be misleading, which can
justify restricting its availability. But that justification is not applicable to the types of
information discussed here.
39. FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 451 (1986).
40. Id. at 461-62.
41. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 888 (2007);
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768-69 (1984).
42. See infra Parts III.A, IV.A, V.A (describing the characteristics of the three types
of cases discussed in this Article).
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approve of using market uncertainty to give patentees greater
freedom in exercising their rights, at least where the public does
not benefit.
This point is emphasized in the Court's patent cases, where
it has been unsympathetic to arguments that private parties
should be permitted to retain for themselves the value of
information that could have provided public benefits. It has been
skeptical even in the settlement context. In United States v.
Singer Manufacturing Co., the government brought an antitrust
challenge to a settlement of a patent interference proceeding,
arguing that there was a possibility that the interference
proceeding could have resulted in invalidation or narrowing of
both parties' claims.43 The Court condemned the agreement and
Justice White offered the following comments in concurrence:
In itself the desire to secure broad claims in a patent
may well be unexceptionable-when purely unilateral
action is involved. And the settlement of an interference in
which the only interests at stake are those of the
adversaries, as in the case of a dispute over relative priority
only and where possible invalidity, because of known prior
art, is not involved, may well be consistent with the general
policy favoring settlement of litigation. But the present case
involves a less innocuous setting. Singer and Gegauf agreed
to settle an interference, at least in part, to prevent an open
fight over validity. There is a public interest here, which
the parties have subordinated to their private ends-the
public interest in granting patent monopolies only when the
progress of the useful arts and of science will be furthered
because as the consideration for its grant the public is given
a novel and useful invention. When there is no novelty and
the public parts with the monopoly grant for no return, the
public has been imposed upon and the patent clause
subverted.4 4
It is notable here that the Court rejected the settlement even
though there was only "possible invalidity."" That is, the result of
the interference was uncertain, so the parties could have
defended the settlement as eliminating the uncertainty and its
associated costs, yet the Court nevertheless struck it down.
The Court reinforced this view in a unilateral context in
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins." The issue in Lear was whether a licensee
was estopped from challenging the validity of the patent it had
43. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 185-89 (1963).
44. Id. at 199-200 (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
45. Id. at 198-99.
46. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
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licensed. Although the Court took the view that licensee
estoppel was an established part of contract doctrine, it rejected
it in the patent context.' Again it pointed to the conflicting
interests of the private parties and the public:
Surely the equities of the licensor do not weigh very
heavily when they are balanced against the important
public interest in permitting full and free competition in the
use of ideas which are in reality a part of the public domain.
Licensees may often be the only individuals with enough
economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an
inventor's discovery. If they are muzzled, the public may
continually be required to pay tribute to would-be
monopolists without need or justification. We think it plain
that the technical requirements of contract doctrine must
give way before the demands of the public interest in the
typical situation involving the negotiation of a license after
a patent has issued."'
As J. Thomas McCarthy has said, "[t]he 'spirit of Lear' appears to
be one of providing some incentive to licensees to encourage them
to challenge patent validity and to eliminate obstacles to suit by
those disposed to challenge the validity of a patent.""o
The Court recently reaffirmed this view in MedImmune, Inc.
v. Genentech, Inc." The issue in MedImmune was whether a
licensee that seeks to challenge patent validity or infringement
must cease paying royalties on the license in order to establish a
case or controversy that will allow the courts to entertain the
action.5 The Court determined that it need not do so, because
often the potential for an infringement action makes an
agreement to pay royalties "coerced," so that sufficient
controversy persists between the parties to support jurisdiction."
Although MedImmune focused primarily on the case-or-
controversy issue, it also commented on the patentee's more
specific patent-law arguments." The patentee argued that
permitting the licensee to at the same time pay royalties under
the license and challenge the patent was to deny the patentee
47. Id. at 660-62.
48. Id. at 668-70.
49. Id. at 670-71. In Lear, the license was agreed upon before the patent was
issued, but the Court ultimately applied the same rule for the entire post-patent-issuance
period. Id at 671-74.
50. J. Thomas McCarthy, "Unmuzzling" The Patent Licensee: Chaos in the Wake of
Lear v. Adkins (Part I), 59 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y 475, 476 (1977).
51. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007).
52. Id. at 120-21.
53. Id. at 122, 133 & n.12.
54. Id. at 134-36.
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what it had negotiated under the contract."' The Court rejected
this argument because the license did not include a no-challenge
clause, but it seemed to express skepticism regarding the validity
of the argument even if such a clause had been present." At the
least, the Court's approach validated the importance of
challenges to patent validity.
Moreover, with reference to this Article's contention that
patentees are using their patents to gain leverage from
information about those patents, it is worth noting that the
Supreme Court, subsequent to Lear, drew a connection between
validity challenges and leveraging cases." In Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, the Court
referred to validity challenges in stating that "[a] patent yielding
returns for a device that fails to meet the congressionally
imposed criteria of patentability is anomalous," and then
observed that "olne obvious manifestation of this principle has
been the series of decisions in which the Court has condemned
attempts to broaden the physical or temporal scope of the patent
monopoly."" It quoted broad statements from Mercoid v. Mid-
Continent Investment Co., a misuse case:
The necessities or convenience of the patentee do not justify
any use of the monopoly of the patent to create another
monopoly.... The method by which the monopoly is sought
to be extended is immaterial. The patent is a privilege. But
it is a privilege which is conditioned by a public purpose. It
results from invention and is limited to the invention which
it defines."
The references to misuse in this context are especially
significant because the issue in Blonder-Tongue was directly
related to the issues here. The question in Blonder-Tongue was
whether a finding of invalidity in litigation against one infringer
could be given res judicata effect in subsequent litigation against
other infringers." A previous Supreme Court case had held that
no estoppel effect would follow from a declaration of invalidity,
but Blonder-Tongue overruled that holding." Thus, the effect of
55. Id. at 134-35.
56. Id. at 135-36.
57. See Alfred C. Server & Peter Singleton, Licensee Patent Validity Challenges
Following MedImmune: Implications for Patent Licensing, 3 HASTINGS Sct. & TECH. L.J.
243, 333-37 (2011).
58. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971).
59. Id. at 343-44 (quoting Mercoid v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666
(1944)) (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 317.
61. Id. at 349-50, overruling Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936).
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Blonder-Tongue was to take what had been private information,
applicable only to the original litigants, and made it public
information, available to all. This approach, of treating
information about patents as public information, is exactly the
one advocated here.
III. SETTLEMENTS OF PATENT LITIGATION
A. Hatch-Waxman Settlements
Antitrust challenges to patent settlements resulting from
filings under the Hatch-Waxman Act have been prominent in the
last decade." The typical scenario is that of a settlement between
a brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturer that owns a patent
claimed to cover a particular drug and a potential generic entrant
to the market for that drug. The potential entrant, in
compliance with Hatch-Waxman procedures, generally asserts
either that the patent is invalid, that its product does not
infringe, or both. Following the initiation of an infringement suit,
as authorized by the Act, the parties settle the dispute on terms
that typically allow the generic company's entry into the market,
but only after some years' delay. Initially, these settlements were
often accompanied by payments from the brand-name patentee to
the generic challenger, called "reverse payments" because
payments in patent litigation settlements typically run in the
other direction, from licensee to patentee." More recently, such
payments have been eliminated in favor of other provisions,
though some of those provisions can also be seen as compensation
to the generic company for the delay."
The commentary in this area has generally focused on the
effect of such a settlement on the alleged infringer's date of entry
into the product market. Those who object to such settlements
argue that the payment is made to (improperly) exclude
competition until the agreed date." Those who support the
settlements-and most recent court decisions have upheld
them-respond that without the settlement, and assuming the
62. See infra text accompanying notes 69-73 & notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
63. FED. TRADE COMM'N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: How DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 2 (2010), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.
64. See id. at 4-10,
65. See Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REv. 37, 78-79 (2009) (describing how payments for
generics not to enter the market have been replaced by payments for "IP licenses, for the
supply of raw materials or finished products, and for helping promote products.").
66. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J.
EcoN. 391, 407 (2003).
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validity of the patent, entry would have been delayed even
longer, until the patent expired.67 Both arguments are focused on
the entry date, and thus on the product market.
The difficulty of assessing the effect of the settlement in this
way arises, of course, from the lack of information about patent
validity. If the patent is valid, the settlement does not eliminate
any competition that would otherwise have existed; if it is not,
then the settlement preserves a monopoly when none is deserved.
Information about validity, if available, would determine
whether the settlement had any anticompetitive effect in the
product market. Because it is not available, however, courts are
unable to determine actual effect. Instead, as is discussed further
below, they typically rely on patent law's presumption of validity.
That is, they state that the patent is presumptively valid, so that
there is no competitive harm from the settlement. In some cases,
they have buttressed this approach by stating, somewhat
disingenuously, that there is no challenge to the patent's validity,
when the cases in fact rely on at least the possibility of invalidity,
even if the challenger does not seek to litigate the validity issue
in the antitrust court."8
Even the recent, and much less deferential, In re K-Dur
Antitrust Litigation decision of the Third Circuit adopted an
approach that did not address the patent validity issue directly.6"
Although K-Dur relied on the importance of challenges to patent
validity, under its approach "the only settlements subject to
antitrust scrutiny are those involving a reverse payment from
the name brand manufacturer to the generic challenger."' That
is so, the court said, "because '[a]bsent proof of other offsetting
consideration, it is logical to conclude that the quid pro quo for
the payment was an agreement by the generic to defer entry
beyond the date that represents an otherwise reasonable
litigation compromise."'n For settlements involving reverse
67. See Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse
Payments: Why Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment
Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 96 IowA L. REv. 57, 107 (2010) (noting
that "an otherwise anticompetitive agreement is not anticompetitive if it is protected by a
valid and infringed patent").
68. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1068 (11th Cir. 2005)
("Although the FTC alleges that Schering's settlement agreements are veiled attempts to
disguise a quid pro quo arrangement aimed at preserving Schering's monopoly in the
potassium chloride supplement market, there has been no allegation that the '743 patent
itself is invalid or that the resulting infringement suits against Upsher and ESI were
'shams."').
69. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).
70. Id. at 218.
71. Id. (quoting In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 988 (2003), vacated,
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payments, the court adopted the "quick look" rule of reason,
which requires defendants to justify their conduct.72 The court
thus replaced previous courts' applications of a presumption of
validity with what is effectively a presumption of invalidity. If
the presence of a reverse payment is a good proxy for
anticompetitive effect, this approach is probably an
improvement, but it might also lead simply to the development of
other means of avoiding validity challenges." In that respect, it is
not clear that the K-Dur approach will confront the validity
issues that underlie these cases.
An alternative approach to these cases is not to focus on the
product market or patent validity at all. Settlements of patent
litigation have effects in another "market," the one for
information regarding the patent's validity. Patent litigation
requires the parties to produce information relevant to both the
validity and the scope of the patent at issue. This information
then helps define the protection, if any, provided by the patent,
which is useful both for the litigants and for nonparties to the
litigation.7 4 Settlement prevents this information from being
produced, or at least prevents it from being made public." In
several extreme cases, parties to patent settlements have even
successfully sought to have previous judgments vacated.
In fact, the market for validity information is a real one,
with firms competing in that market to provide search and
analysis services for prior art." The parties to Hatch-Waxman
settlements would likely contract for such services if the
litigation proceeded," so the agreement not to pursue litigation
402 F.3d 1056 (2005)).
72. Id. (describing application of the "quick look" rule of reason analysis).
73. See Shapiro, supra note 66, at 78-79.
74. See generally Jay Pil Choi, Patent Litigation as an Information-Transmission
Mechanism, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 1249 (1998).
75. It is possible that the parties would already be in possession of such
information, which they might have obtained in anticipation of or preparation for the
litigation.
76. See Jeremy W. Bock, An Empirical Study of Certain Settlement-Related Motions
for Vacatur in Patent Cases, 88 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (noting the results of an
analysis in which 78.5% of cases resulted in a granted motion for vacatur).
77. See, e.g., List of Patent Search Firms, AM. AsS'N LAW LIBRARIES,
http://www.aallnet.org/sis/pllsis/Groups/PatentSearchFirms.doc (last visited Nov. 9, 2012)
(listing multiple patent search firms in America, Japan, and the United Kingdom);
Farhad Manjoo, How a Bunch of Amateur Sleuths Are Stamping Out Patent Trolls,
SLATE.COM (Feb. 29, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/
2012/02/articleone partnershow.a bunch of amateursleuthsare stampingout.pate
nt trolls_.html ("There's an entire industry devoted to conducting such searches.").
78. See Manjoo, supra note 77 ("When companies are sued for patent infringement,
or when they're proactively protecting themselves from an infringement claim, they often
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is in some sense an agreement not to participate in that
market.
From this perspective, a settlement of patent litigation is not
so much a determination of the parties' rights to patented
technology as it is a technique for preserving uncertainty
regarding the patent rights at issue. That uncertainty is of value
both to the patentee and to the alleged infringer if the patent is
in fact invalid, because the settlement allows them both
privileged access to the market.79 It is also valuable to both
parties even if the patent appears to be valid. Access to the
market is a windfall to the challenger in that case, but for the
patentee it is also valuable to avoid litigation that might narrow
the patent or reveal strategies or damaging information
regarding prior art that could be used by future challengers.
It might not be immediately clear how the information about
the patent right differs from that right itself, but the distinction
may be made more clear by reference to tangible property.
Suppose there are two bridges, X and Y, over a river, and that all
other means of crossing the river are significantly more
expensive. Suppose also that A, the purported owner of both
bridges, charges a monopoly price for crossing the river. Now,
suppose that B asserts an ownership claim to bridge Y; perhaps
B argues that a previous transfer to A was invalid and that B is
the rightful owner. B also announces that if its claim to bridge Y
is upheld, it will charge much less for crossing the river than A
charges (though of course competition might make lower prices
inevitable). Finally, suppose that A and B settle their dispute
over ownership of bridge Y by agreeing that A will retain
ownership for five years, after which ownership will be
transferred to B. As part of this settlement, A pays B a sum of
money, or perhaps compensates B in some other way.
It is difficult to imagine that a court would approve a
settlement that keeps the bridge in A's hands, because the
anticompetitive effect of such a settlement is clear. By making its
claim to bridge Y, just as generic drug companies must allege
validity or non-infringement under the Hatch-Waxman Act, B
makes information about the property right competitively
important. Moreover, in this tangible-property context, the
property at issue, which is the bridge itself, and the information
about it, which would be documentation of ownership and
hire a prior art search firm to look for related inventions.").
79. The generic company's actual access comes only with some delay, but if the
settlement compensates it in some way for the delay, then it effectively enters the market
immediately.
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transfers, are separate. As a result, it is apparent that the
competitive effects of settling the dispute arise from the
agreement not to dispute that information, not from the property
right itself.
In the patent context, though, the patent is intangible
property that gives the patentee exclusive rights over the use of
the information disclosed in the patent. That information both
defines the scope of the property right itself and, based on its
relationship to the prior art, determines its validity. Hence, the
patent as property is not as easily distinguished from the
information that determines its validity as in the case of tangible
property. It may be for that reason that patent courts sometimes
fail to distinguish the two sorts of information at issue:
information about the invention, which is information over which
the patentee has exclusive rights, and information about the
patent's validity, over which the patentee has no exclusive rights.
B. Patent Validity and Scope of the Patent
Regardless of how the analogous issue would be resolved for
tangible property, the legal treatment of Hatch-Waxman
settlements has become quite deferential. One of the early
appellate cases challenging a reverse payment held the agreement
to be per se illegal on the ground that it is impermissible for the
brand-name company to compensate the generic company for not
competing, because it effectively allocates the market to the brand-
name company."o Subsequently, though, the courts have focused
more on the patent at issue. Some suggestions have been made,
notably by the FTC, that the antitrust resolution of the cases
should effectively be based on a mini-trial on patent validity,
making antitrust depend explicitly on patent law." More recently,
the courts have converged on an approach that focuses on the
scope of the patent. The leading case states that "the proper
analysis of antitrust liability requires an examination of: (1) the
scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to
which the agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting
anticompetitive effects."
80. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 907-08 (6th Cir. 2003)
(holding that an agreement between a brand-name and generic company to delay the
generic company's entry into the market in exchange of $89.83 million was a per se illegal
restraint of trade).
81. See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012)
(explaining the FTC's desire to decide "a patent case within an antitrust case about the
settlement of the patent case").
82. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005).
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As described briefly above, inquiry into the "scope of the
patent" has traditionally been used in misuse cases to determine
whether a patentee is impermissibly enlarging its monopoly. It is
not clear, however, what it could mean to say that an agreement
that suppresses information about the validity of a patent is
within the scope of the patent. A competitive effect that is within
the scope of a patent would presumably be one that, at a
minimum, turns on a right to exclusive use of information that is
in that patent. That would be consistent with the interpretation
of the concept that is applied in traditional misuse cases. But
litigation about patent validity or infringement would not turn on
any information to which the patentee has an exclusive right.
One need not infringe a patent to litigate it.8
The connection between misuse, or use of a patent outside
its scope, and the act of bringing suit on a possibly invalid patent
was made by the Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue and by
Lemley and Shapiro in their discussion of probabilistic patents.8 4
In fact, the scope argument in this context is entirely circular. If
the patent is valid, an agreement that delays entry of a
competitor that uses the patented technology is within the scope
of the patent, but validity is exactly the issue on which legality of
the agreement turns, so relying on scope is assuming the result
of the argument." As suggested above, the courts here fail to
appreciate that the uncertainty that the patentee is exploiting is
neither within nor without the scope of the patent, but makes it
impossible to know whether the patent is legally valid, i.e.,
whether it even makes sense to talk of the patent's scope.
Courts also rely on patent law's presumption of validity.
Patent law provides that "[a] patent shall be presumed valid,'"'
and the court in Schering-Plough said that "without any evidence
to the contrary, there is a presumption that the [patent at issue]
is a valid one, which gives Schering the ability to exclude those
who infringe on its product."" But this elevates what is
83. In fact, the Hatch-Waxman Act itself gives the patentee the right to bring an
infringement suit upon the generic company's simple declaration that the patent is
invalid or not infringed. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2006). And MedImmune allowed a
claim of invalidity by a licensee in good standing. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
549 U.S. 118, 122, 135 (2007).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24 and 57-61.
85. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012) ("Wle take
issue with the scope of the patent test's almost unrebuttable presumption of patent
validity. This presumption assumes away the question being litigated in the underlying
patent suit, enforcing a presumption that the patent holder would have prevailed.").
86. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
87. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1068; see also In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust
Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 392 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[So long as the patent litigation is neither a
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presumably a procedural device to a substantive rule." The court
said that: "Schering obtained the legal right to exclude [the
potential generic entrants] from the market until they proved
either that the [patent] was invalid or that their products . .. did
not infringe Schering's patent."9 That may be true, but it simply
does not follow that the presumption should protect agreements
that prevent exactly those challenges. By applying the
presumption in this way, the courts are taking a provision that
would normally be used in, and presumably is intended for,
litigation that would resolve uncertainty regarding a patent, and
they are relying on it to preserve that uncertainty.
That is not to say that the courts have ignored uncertainty in
the Hatch-Waxman cases. In fact, they have emphasized it, and
justified the settlements in part on the grounds that the uncertainty
of patent litigation would lessen innovation incentives.90 As
described above, though, the Supreme Court has not taken this
view, instead extolling the benefits of patent litigation, and in
particular challenges to patent validity. Although uncertainty
obviously imposes costs, the Hatch-Waxman cases fail to take into
account the benefits and incentives of patent challenges. The
presumption of validity is expressly rebuttable, which is a
congressional choice of litigation uncertainty instead of the finality
that a conclusive presumption could have established for patents.
Another aspect of uncertainty relied upon by the courts
considering pharmaceutical settlements is what they describe as
the Hatch-Waxman Act's redistribution of risk, which they rely
on to justify allowing settlements that eliminate patent
challenges: "By contrast, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments grant
sham nor otherwise baseless, the patent holder is seeking to arrive at a settlement in
order to protect that to which it is presumably entitled: a lawful monopoly over the
manufacture and distribution of the patented product."); In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Above all,
making the legality of a patent settlement agreement, on pain of treble damages,
contingent on a later court's assessment of the patent's validity might chill patent
settlements altogether. Moreover, .. . such an approach would undermine the
presumption of validity of patents in all cases, as it could not logically be limited to drug
patents, and would work a revolution in patent law.").
88. Section 282 follows its statement of the presumption with the direction that
"[tihe burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the
party asserting such invalidity." 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006); see also In re K-Dur Antitrust
Litig., 686 F.3d at 214 ("While persons challenging the validity of a patent in litigation
bear the burden of defeating a presumption of validity, this presumption is intended
merely as a procedural device and is not a substantive right of the patent holder.").
89. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1066-67.
90. See id at 1075 ("Finally, the caustic environment of patent litigation may
actually decrease product innovation by amplifying the period of uncertainty around the
drug manufacturer's ability to research, develop, and market the patented product or
allegedly infringing product.").
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generic manufacturers standing to mount a validity challenge
without incurring the cost of entry or risking enormous damages
flowing from any possible infringement."" This seems to assume
that possible infringement liability outside the Hatch-Waxman
context is a desirable restraint on validity challenges, but there
is no support for that view elsewhere. Indeed, the Supreme
Court's elimination of licensee estoppel, and particularly its
decision in MedImmune, which allowed a licensee to challenge
the validity of a patent while still remaining protected by the
license, appears to be a clear rejection of that view."
All this suggests that to the extent that some patent
settlements serve to suppress valuable information, it could be
appropriate to deny parties the ability to settle. That may seem
like an extreme solution, but the value of settlements has been
questioned before. In his essay Against Settlement, Owen Fiss
took issue with the then-recent push toward alternative dispute
resolution, and particularly with settlement of litigation." He
stated that "[t]o be against settlement is only to suggest that
when the parties settle, society gets less than what appears, and
for a price it does not know it is paying." He acknowledged a
settlement's benefit in resolving the dispute between the parties,
but he nevertheless objected to settlements because they fail to
achieve other purposes served by the judicial system." In
general, he argued, settlement is not preferable to judgment and
"should be treated instead as a highly problematic technique for
streamlining dockets.""
Several of Fiss's concerns arose primarily with class actions
and with other litigation for social change, but his aim was
broader." Anticipating an argument that his points would apply
to only a subset of lawsuits, Fiss listed four situations in which
he believes they are applicable, and one of those is "where there
is a genuine social need for an authoritative interpretation of
91. Id. at 1074 (citing In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F.
Supp. 2d 188, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)).
92. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 135 (2007).
93. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984)
(discussing how alternative dispute resolution pressures parties to settle existing
litigation and reduces future litigation).
94. Id. at 1085.
95. See id. (stating that adjudication "employs not strangers chosen by the parties
but public officials" whose duty is to interpret and uphold the values in "authoritative
texts such as the Constitution and statutes").
96. Id. at 1075.
97. See id. at 1078-80, 1087 (stating that settlements impair individuals' autonomy
and do not provide procedures for authoritative consent from groups such as ethnic or
racial minorities, inmates of prisons, or the mentally ill).
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law."" Because of the costs of uncertainty regarding patents,
patent litigation is an instance where there is such a need. This
is the basic point of Lear and Blonder-Tongue, and much of the
language in those cases is an echo (actually, a pre-echo) of Fiss's
observations." Although patent law presumes that a granted
patent is valid,'o it also recognizes that both the validity and the
scope of patent claims are uncertain, and it makes them subject
to litigation. Allowing patentees and licensees to subvert that
process disturbs the balance struck by patent law.
Of course a settlement does not only suppress information to
which the patentee has no exclusive right; it also can provide
permission to use information about the invention, which is
information to which the patentee does have an exclusive right.
The difficulty is in deciding which is the more prominent effect of
a settlement, or whether settlements that resolve disputes about
access to patented information can be preserved while restricting
settlements that suppress access to unpatented information. This
is not the place for detailed exploration of these issues,' but it is
far from clear that the courts in the pharmaceutical cases have
taken the right approach by not even seeking to address that
problem, particularly as they seem to be going in a direction
opposite from that of the Supreme Court. A focus on the
informational effects of patent settlements could provide a
helpful perspective on this issue.
IV. PATENT PORTFOLIOS AND LICENSING
A. Information and Licensing
As Parchomovsky and Wagner argue, when patent portfolios
become larger, the inventions described and claimed in the
individual patents in the portfolios become increasingly
irrelevant."2 And patent portfolios have indeed become large.
Microsoft apparently has more than 50,000 patents, 03 and very
98. Id. at 1087.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 46-61.
100. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
101. I offered some preliminary suggestions in a presentation at the 2011 Spring
Meeting of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law. See Mark R. Patterson, Patent Settlements,
Risk, and Competition, Patent Settlements: The Issues Beyond the "Reverse Payment"
Cases, 59th Annual Antitrust Spring Meeting (Mar. March 30, 2011), available at
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty-scholarship2.
102. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 8, at 66 (stating that investors will
focus on the value of an entire patent portfolio rather than individual patents because of
the difficulty in assessing the value of individual patents).
103. See Order No. 32: Initial Determination Granting Microsoft's Motion for
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large portfolios have recently been transferred in significant
acquisitions. Google is acquiring Motorola Mobility's portfolio of
17,000 patents and 6,800 applications,'04 and a coalition of
Microsoft, Apple, RIM, and others are acquiring Nortel's
portfolio, with 6,000 patents.'o
Potential licensees certainly want access to some of the
specific technologies in these portfolios. It is also true, though,
that the sheer number of patents in the portfolios makes
evaluation of possible infringement very difficult. More
important for competition purposes, the cost of assessing
infringement potential is greater for larger portfolios. Therefore,
holders of small portfolios are at a relative cost disadvantage to
those with larger ones, independent of the significance of the
patents themselves. This cost disadvantage in itself, independent
of the actual content of the patents, can give holders of large
portfolios a competitive advantage.
It is often assumed that these large patent portfolios are
routinely cross-licensed. For example, the antitrust agencies'
2007 report, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property
Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition, considered the
possibility that portfolio licensing could act as a barrier to entry,
but said that some who had testified at the hearings questioned
the significance of that danger because "companies engaged in
portfolio cross-licensing are generally willing to license their
portfolios to all interested parties."' This might have been true
once, but the ongoing cell phone patent wars show that it is true
no longer."0 ' Moreover, even if licensing is achieved, the licensing,
Summary Determination of Respondents' First Affirmative Defense of Patent Misuse at 5,
Certain Handheld Electronic Computing Devices, Related Software, and Components
Thereof 11, Inv. No. 337-TA-769 (Jan. 31, 2012), 2012 WL 504367 at *2 [hereinafter Order
No. 32] (referring to "Microsoft's over 65,000 patents"); Joff Wild, Microsoft to Have 50,000
Patents Within Two Years, Phelps Reveals, INTELLECTUAL ASSET MGMT BLOG
(Oct. 21, 2008), http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=ae6e78c-5c40-4b8f-
bb54-6e27314a4b39 (last visited Nov. 9, 2012) (reporting that Marshall Phelps, Corporate
Vice President for Intellectual Property Policy and Strategy at Microsoft, stated that in
2010 Microsoft would have a portfolio of approximately 50,000 patents).
104. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Statement of the Dep't of Justice's Antitrust Div.
on Its Decision to Close Its Investigations of Google Inc.'s Acquisition of Motorola Mobility
Holdings Inc. and the Acquisitions of Certain Patents by Apple Inc.,
Microsoft Corp. and Research in Motion Ltd. (Feb. 13, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February/12-at-210.html.
105. Id.
106. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 62 (2007).
107. See Josh Lowensohn, 2010 Apple License Offer to Samsung: $30 Per
Smartphone, $40 Per Tablet, CNET NEWS (Aug. 10, 2012, 8:51 PM),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579-3-57491406-37/2010-apple-license-offer-to-samsung-$30-
per-smartphone-$40-per-tablet/ (stating that Samsung rejected Apple's cross-licensing
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or cross-licensing, process is expensive. There is surprisingly
little research on the mechanics of the cross-licensing process,
given its importance, but the source usually cited, an article by
Peter Grindley and David Teece from 1997, describes years of
preparatory work in cross-licensing.'
The information costs of evaluating and licensing portfolios
raise questions about Mark Lemley's theory of rational ignorance
at the patent office.o' He argues that even if the Patent and
Trademark Office does a poor job at reviewing patent
applications, little harm results because most patents will never
be enforced anyway."o In fact, he argues, spending money on
doing a good job would in most cases be a waste of effort, and it is
better for courts to conduct more thorough reviews, but only on
patents that are litigated."' This theory reflects the phenomenon
that Parchomovsky and Wagner sought to explain, which is that
individual patents are becoming less and less valuable." As they
explain, though, patent portfolios continue to be valuable.
Indeed, from a purely informational view, a portfolio of
thousands of low-quality patents is more valuable than one of
dozens of high-quality patents, because it is much more difficult
and costly to assess. Lemley addresses the informational issue,
but he does so by arguing that many licenses are royalty-free,
though he acknowledges that there is little information on the
issue."' In any case, the point here is not that more money
should be spent on patent examination, but that the
informational aspects of portfolios have competitive
significance."
In the litigation context, the importance of the informational
issue is highlighted when a firm seeks specifically to exploit it.
An example of this occurred in recent litigation between Microsoft,
as the patentee, and Barnes & Noble, maker of the Nook e-reader,
offer and instead the two went to trial). For more general information on the cell phone
patent wars, see FOSS PATENTS, http://www.fosspatents.com (last visited Nov. 9, 2012).
108. Peter C. Grindley & David J. Teece, Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing
and Cross-licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics, 39 CAL. MGMT. REV. 8, 19 (1997).
109. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
1495, 1514 (2001). Doubts about the "rational ignorance" approach are also offered in
Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEx. L. REV. 283, 290-94 & n.64 (2011),
which describes how problems associated with rational ignorance make it less than
"optimal."
110. Lemley, supra note 109, at 1514.
111. Id. at 1510-11.
112. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 8, at 66.
113. Lemley, supra note 109, at 1503-08, 1511-12.
114. Lemley briefly addresses the broader question of the social costs imposed by
poor-quality patents, id. at 1515-20, but he does not focus on the issue addressed here.
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which is an Android product."' Barnes & Noble alleged that in their
negotiations Microsoft initially refused to disclose which patents it
claimed were being infringed unless Barnes & Noble agreed to a
nondisclosure agreement."' Then, when Microsoft filed a complaint
with the International Trade Commission (ITC), some of the
patents that it alleged were infringed were ones that it had not
previously disclosed in the negotiations."'
There is of course no general obligation on patentees to disclose
their patents to infringers prior to bringing suit,"' but Barnes &
Noble contended, in effect, that Microsoft's practice was to use the
informational value of its portfolio, as the court described:
Barnes & Noble argues that Microsoft has never definitely
identified which of Microsoft's over 65,000 patents are
infringed by Android and that Microsoft has not conducted
"sufficient technical analysis before demanding licensing
fees from original equipment manufacturers ('OEMs') and
original device manufacturers ('ODMs')." Barnes & Noble
contends that even though the patents are "trivial" it
cannot work around them because Microsoft has said that it
would simply come forward with other patents to assert
against Barnes & Noble."'
More colorfully, in its petition for reconsideration of the
dismissal of its misuse claim, Barnes & Noble cited deposition
testimony contending that Microsoft's individual patents were
irrelevant to its enforcement efforts:
[Wihat [Microsoft] basically told us was, it doesn't matter if
you have defenses, whether you don't infringe, whether our
115. Amended Verified Complaint of Microsoft Corporation Under Section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, as Amended, Certain Handheld Electronic Computing Devices, Related
Software, and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-769 (Apr. 8, 2011), 2011 WL 1823599
[ 27.
116. Jay Greene, Barnes & Noble Wants DOJ Probe into Microsoft Patent Tactics,
CNET NEWS (Nov. 8, 2011, 12:04 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-10805_3-57320 8 00-
75/barnes-noble-wants-doj-probe-into-microsoft-patent-tactics/.
117. Order No. 32, supra note 103, at 11, 2012 WL 504367 at *2. This is not the first
occasion on which Microsoft has "asserted" patents without disclosing them. See Roger
Parloff, Microsoft Takes on the Free World, FORTUNE, May 14, 2007, at 76, 82, available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortunefortunearchive/2007/05/28/100033867/
("[Microsoft licensing official Horaciol Gutierrez refuses to identify specific patents or
explain how they're being infringed, lest FOSS [free and open-source software] advocates
start filing challenges to them.").
118. T.J. Chiang has argued that we should approach the problem of matching
patents and possible infringers as one of imposing the search obligation on the lower-cost
searcher, and that when a patentee is the lower-cost searcher but fails in its duty, the
infringer should have a defense against infringement claims. See T.J. Chiang, The
Reciprocity of Search, 66 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 19-20, 36-37),
available at httpJ/papers.ssrn.comsol3/papers.cfin?abstractlid=1966676##.
119. Order No. 32, supra note 103, at 11, 2012 WL 504367 at *5.
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patents are invalid, you're going to need to take a license,
because there's no way that you can get out of our grasp,
that we have so many patents that we could overwhelm
YU120you.x2
Although Microsoft and Barnes & Noble settled the case,121
preventing further development of the law on these issues, the
dispute illustrates how a single patentee with 1,000 patents
could potentially have greater power, at least in some respects,
than 1,000 patentees, each with a single patent. The holder of a
large portfolio of patents can threaten to exploit them
sequentially as Microsoft did and can use nondisclosure to
increase its power, options that are not available to holders of
one or a few patents. The question then is whether this conduct
should be permissible.
B. The Costs of Validity Challenges
In the Microsoft-Barnes & Noble litigation discussed above,
the administrative law judge rejected a patent misuse theory,
stating that "there is absolutely nothing about such tactics that
expand the scope of any patent."22 As with the use of the "scope"
analysis for Hatch-Waxman settlements, it is unclear what the ALJ
might have meant by this conclusion. It is true that Microsoft did
not seek to restrict the use of non-infringing products, the most
typical misuse practice." But Microsoft's reference to its plan to
assert other patents suggests that enforcing the particular patents
that it sued on was not Microsoft's goal, either. Its goal, that is, was
broader than those patents, and that begins to sound like misuse.
Suppose, drawing on Barnes & Noble's allegation, that a
patentee claimed to have dozens of individual patents that were
120. Respondents Barnes & Noble, Inc.'s and Barnesandnoble.com LLC's Petition for
Review of Order No. 32: Initial Determination Granting Microsoft's Motion for Summary
Determination of Respondent's First Affirmative Defense of Patent Misuse 7, Certain
Handheld Electronic Computing Devices, Related Software, and Components Thereof,
Inv. No. 337-TA-769 (Apr. 8, 2011), available at http://www.groklawnet/pdf3/MSvBNITC-
719445-471458.pdf.
121. Paul Thurrott, Microsoft and Barnes & Noble Settle Patent Battle, Will Team on
Nook Spinoff, WINDOWS IT PRO (Apr. 30, 2012, 8:48 AM), http://www.windowsitpro.com/
article/paul-thurrotts-wininfo/microsoft-barnes-noble-settle-patent-battle-team-nook-
spinoff-142947.
122. Order No. 32, supra note 103, at 11, 2012 WL 504367 at *5. It is worth noting,
though, that the ALJ also said that "the patent laws provide Barnes & Noble with other
avenues to obtain relief if the case is meritless or Microsoft engages in other litigation
misconduct." Id.
123. See Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency ofAntitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse,
55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 402 (2003) (discussing the history and theory behind patent
misuse).
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infringed by a competitor's product, but that it would not identify
those patents for the competitor. Further suppose that the
competitor could easily (though perhaps not quickly) design
around each of those patents. Finally, suppose that the patentee
brought suit on each patent sequentially, making clear that
further suits were in the offing. What is the purpose, in an
infringement suit based on patent A, of warning the alleged
infringer that future suits, based on undisclosed patents B, C, D,
E, and F, are coming? It seems that such a warning cannot be
motivated by anything within the scope of patent A. Nor,
presumably, could it be within the scope of the other patents,
since those patents have not even been disclosed. As discussed
above, for information to be within the scope of a patent, the
information should be that which is protected by patent law. It is
difficult to see how the use, or threatened use, of patents that are
not disclosed could satisfy this test. Given that the alleged
infringer has no means of assessing either validity or
infringement, the "assertion" of undisclosed patents seems
intended to exploit uncertainty, not to exploit patents.
A somewhat similar point regarding scope was made by
Rubinfeld and Maness regarding the linking together in
portfolios of strong and weak patents:
Bundling patents together into inseparable packages may
also reduce a firm's incentive to challenge individual
patents. If the cost of challenging patents increases with
the number of patents included in the bundle, a firm may
have an incentive to include weak patents in the package.
Weak patents in conjunction with inseparable bundles can
lead to patent misuse if the bundle is used to extend a
firm's monopoly power from the "space" covered by a strong
patent to the space encompassed by the strong and weak
patents together. The package itself alters rivals' behavior
in deciding whether it is efficient to license or design
around individual patents, and raise costs directly (through
license fees) and indirectly by altering the incentive to
invest in R&D and to innovate.124
The difference between the approaches of Microsoft and
Barnes & Noble seems to be based on a fundamental difference in
how the two parties view the role of patent portfolios. Microsoft
seems to view a portfolio as a unit, to be licensed as a whole and
in which the individual patents are not significant (presumably
assuming that at least one of them is infringed). Barnes & Noble,
on the other hand, appears to view a portfolio as a collection of
124. Rubinfeld & Maness, supra note 29, at 90-91.
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individual patents, in which the validity and infringement of
each is relevant. For Barnes & Noble, it appears that the
royalties paid for a portfolio should be the sum of royalties on
individual patents, rather than an undifferentiated total.
The Federal Circuit's cases seem to take Microsoft's side.
Although the court has not considered portfolio issues in exactly
this context, it has discussed related points in the context of
patent pools, particularly in U.S. Philips Corp. v. ITC."s The
court there relied on the difficulty of valuing individual patents
in rejecting a claim of misuse based on a requirement of package
licensing:
Finally, grouping licenses in a package allows the parties to
price the package based on their estimate of what it is
worth to practice a particular technology, which is typically
much easier to calculate than determining the marginal
benefit provided by a license to each individual patent. In
short, package licensing has the procompetitive effect of
reducing the degree of uncertainty associated with
126investment decisions .
As with the Hatch-Waxman courts above, the Federal
Circuit here rightly points to the costs of uncertainty, but
wrongly neglects the costs of the solution it approves. The
discussion above suggests that potential licensees in the
portfolio context could pay less, or perhaps avoid infringement
entirely, if they knew what patents they were accused of
infringing and whether it would be more efficient to license or
design around the patents. To make the latter decision, the
individual cost of licensing each individual patent would be
needed. But if a patentee insists on licensing its portfolio as a
whole, without identifying which particular patents are infringed or
what the royalty for licensing them individually would be, a licensee
is unable to make the determinations that are necessary for
sensible decisionmaking in the licensing process.
Moreover, the passage above shows little concern for the
possibility of and incentives for challenging individual patents.
Indeed, the court reinforced its use of uncertainty as a
justification for package licensing in a way that seems directly
contrary to the Supreme Court's views in Lear:
Package licensing can also obviate any potential patent
disputes between a licensor and a licensee and thus reduce
the likelihood that a licensee will find itself involved in
125. U.S. Philips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1191-93 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
126. Id. at 1193.
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costly litigation over unlicensed patents with potentially
adverse consequences for both parties, such as a finding
that the licensee infringed the unlicensed patents or that
the unlicensed patents were invalid.'
This turns the uncertainty problem on its head. As the Supreme
Court has made clear, the licensing of an invalid patent is at
least akin to misuse,"' so if package licensing assists patentees in
avoiding findings of invalidity, that should be viewed as a cost,
not a benefit.
The Federal Circuit also raised concerns about changes in
licensing terms as either technology or views above the validity of
the licensed patents evolved:
In addition, as in its per se analysis, the Commission
did not acknowledge the problems with licensing patents
individually, such as the transaction costs associated with
making individual patent-by-patent royalty determinations
and monitoring possible infringement of patents that
particular licensees chose not to license. The Commission
also did not address the problem, noted above, that changes
in the technology for manufacturing compact discs could
render some patents that were indisputably essential at the
time of licensing arguably nonessential at some later point
in the life of the license. To hold that a licensing agreement
that satisfied the rule of reason when executed became
unreasonable at some later point because of technological
development would introduce substantial uncertainty into
the market and displace settled commercial arrangements
in favor of uncertainty that could only be resolved through
expensive litigation.2 9
This justification was explicitly rejected by the Supreme
Court in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.s0
Although the Supreme Court there specifically acknowledged the
transaction-cost concerns relied upon by the Federal Circuit, it
did not believe that they overrode other factors:
We also think patent misuse inheres in a patentee's
insistence on a percentage-of-sales royalty, regardless of
use, and his rejection of licensee proposals to pay only for
actual use. Unquestionably, a licensee must pay if he uses
the patent. Equally, however, he may insist upon paying
only for use, and not on the basis of total sales, including
products in which he may use a competing patent or in
127. Id. at 1192-93.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 57-61.
129. U.S. Philips Corp., 424 F.3d at 1198.
130. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 139-40 (1968).
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which no patented ideas are used at all. There is nothing in
the right granted the patentee to keep others from using,
selling, or manufacturing his invention which empowers
him to insist on payment not only for use, but also for
producing products which do not employ his discoveries at
all.
Of course, a licensee cannot expect to obtain a
license, giving him the privilege of use and insurance
against infringement suits, without at least footing the
patentee's expenses in dealing with him. He cannot insist
upon paying on use alone and perhaps, as things turn
out, pay absolutely nothing because he finds he can
produce without using the patent. If the risks of
infringement are real and he would avoid them, he must
anticipate some minimum charge for the license-enough
to insure the patentee against loss in negotiating and
administering his monopoly, even if in fact the patent is
not used at all. But we discern no basis in the statutory
monopoly granted the patentee for his using that
monopoly to coerce an agreement to pay a percentage
royalty on merchandise not employing the discovery
which the claims of the patent define.
Thus, the Supreme Court takes the view that changes in use of
the patent should be reflected in changes in the licensing terms.
A patentee may be justified in demanding that costs it incurs in
licensing and changing the licensing terms be paid by the
licensee, but it is not justified in insisting upon continued
licensing of an invalid or non-infringed patent.
The Court recently reaffirmed this view in MedImmune, Inc.
v. Genentech, Inc. As described above, the Court in MedImmune
allowed a licensee to challenge a license after the licensee
concluded that the patent was invalid and not infringed. The
existence of the license did not make subsequent challenge
impermissible:
[The licensee] is not repudiating or impugning the
contract while continuing to reap its benefits. Rather, it is
asserting that the contract, properly interpreted, does not
prevent it from challenging the patents, and does not
require the payment of royalties because the patents do not
cover its products and are invalid.132
Although this Article does not seek to offer a detailed
solution for resolving these issues, the key is to ensure that
131. Id.
132. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 135 (2007).
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potential licensees have, or can obtain, the information that they
need to decide whether to license, design around, or challenge
particular patents. The Supreme Court has indicated that royalty
terms that go beyond a typical one patent-one product scenario
should derive from the "convenience of the parties rather than
patent power.""' For portfolios, that suggests that licensees
should have the option to license, or to refuse to license,
individual patents,"' though the Court has also indicated that
licensees can be required to pay the transaction costs of making
that option available."' It also requires that licensees have the
information needed to make the relevant decisions, which
presumably would rule out the sorts of nondisclosure that
Microsoft is alleged to have used against Barnes & Noble.
Indeed, it might be appropriate to impose on patentees the sorts
of disclosure obligations recently suggested by T.J. Chiang.3 6
133. Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. at 138. The Court made that statement in the
somewhat analogous context of royalty calculations based on total sales, in the case in
which some of the sales are of products not covered by the relevant patents. Id. at 135. In
Zenith Radio Corp., the Court discussed its earlier decision in Automatic Radio
Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950), where it had
approved such a calculation:
The Court's opinion in Automatic Radio did not deal with the license
negotiations which spawned the royalty formula at issue and did not indicate
that (the patentee] used its patent leverage to coerce a promise to pay royalties
on radios not practicing the learning of the patent. No such inference follows
from a mere license provision measuring royalties by the licensee's total sales
even if, as things work out, only some or none of the merchandise employs the
patented idea or process, or even if it was foreseeable that some undetermined
portion would not contain the invention. It could easily be, as the Court
indicated in Automatic Radio, that the licensee as well as the patentee would
find it more convenient and efficient from several standpoints to base royalties
on total sales than to face the burden of figuring royalties based on actual use. If
convenience of the parties rather than patent power dictates the total-sales
royalty provision, there are no misuse of the patents and no forbidden conditions
attached to the license.
Id. at 138.
134. It is worth addressing one final, information-related argument from the Federal
Circuit in U.S. Philips that could pose an obstacle to such a solution. The court said there
that the nonessential patents in the package were "bonuses" given to the licensee for free.
U.S. Philips Corp., 424 F.3d at 1191-92. That is so, the court contended, because the
patentee will charge the maximum possible price for its essential patents, so that the
licensee will be unwilling to pay any more for nonessential patents. Id. This is incorrect.
Suppose that a licensee is willing to pay $100 to acquire both the essential and
nonessential technologies. (Non-essential technology here presumably means a technology
in which the patentee faces competition.) Suppose also that a nonessential technology
that competes with the patentee's is available for $10. The patentee could then charge a
maximum of $90 for the essential technology. It could also charge $99 for the combination
of the essential technology and its own nonessential technology. It cannot charge $99 for
the essential technology alone, as the court seems to believe.
135. See supra text accompanying note 131.
136. See supra note 118.
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Such obligations, which he recommends when the costs to
patentees of identifying potential infringers are lower than the
costs of potential infringers of locating patents, are likely to be
applicable in the portfolio context, as well as in the standard-
setting context discussed in the next section.
V. DECEPTION IN STANDARD-SETTING
A. Deception in Antitrust Law
A final prominent example of an informational effect
involving patents is that of deception before standard-setting
organizations. The informational effects are obvious here: either
information about the existence of the patent is hidden during
the standard-setting process, or false information is provided
about the patentee's future licensing terms, then, after adoption
of a standard that incorporates the patented technology, the
patentee demands significant royalties. The commitment of users
to the standard, and thus to the patented technology, allows the
patentee to exploit them by extracting a higher license price, in
what is often referred to as a patent "holdup.""'
The issue in these cases is not so much uncertainty as
deception.' (Even the nondisclosure of patents generally
137. Julie Brill, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, The Intersection of Patent Law and
Competition Policy, Keynote Address at the Silicon Flatirons Center, University of
Colorado Law School 3 (Oct. 3, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/brill/
121003patentip.pdf ("We also recommended that courts incorporate into their injunction
analysis concerns about the effect that an injunction may have on a patent holder's ability
to obtain royalties exceeding the economic value of an invention-what we call 'patent
hold-up.'").
138. It is possible, of course, that a patentee could be in a position to holdup firms
complying with a standard even without deception. For example, if the patentee did not
participate in the standard-setting process, it would generally have no occasion to make
any commitment at all, truthful or deceptive, to the standard-setting organization. But
most of the U.S. cases have involved at least arguably claims of deception. See Bruce H.
Kobayashi & Joshua D. Wright, Federalism, Substantive Preemption, and Limits on
Antitrust: An Application to Patent Holdup, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 469, 489 (2009)
("Patent holdup involving deception forms the basis for the majority of recent cases
involving opportunism against [standard setting organizations].").
Interestingly, in Europe, the focus is less on deception and more on the effort to
extract large royalty payments, which in certain circumstances has itself been held to be
abusive. See, e.g., Orange-Book-Standard Decision, Bundesgerichtshoft [BGH] [Federal
Court of Justice] May 6, 2009 (Ger.), KZR 39/06, English translation.
available at http://www.ipeg.eu/blog/wp-contentluploads/EN-Translation-BGH-Orange-
Book-Standard-eng.pdf (discussing remedies available to licensees who consider licensor
royalty claims to be excessive.); Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. v SK Kassetten
GmbH & Co. KG, District Court The Hague, The Netherlands, 17 March 2010, Joint
Cases No. 316533/HA ZA 08-2522 and 316535/HA ZA 08-2524. For a discussion and
translation of relevant sections of Koninklijke, see NL-Philips v. SK Kasetten/FRAND,
EPLAW PATENT BLOG (Mar.17, 2010), http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/eplaw/2010/03/nl-
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involves active deception, because most standard-setting
organizations require that participants in the standard-setting
process agree to disclose their patents.") Consequently, the
Supreme Court cases discussed earlier are not directly relevant.
It is possible that the Court would view deception as even more
anticompetitive than private suppression of information, but that
is not clear. Antitrust has not always applied a consistent
approach to issues of deception, sometimes dismissing them as
issues of consumer protection or fraud, rather than antitrust.
The lower courts that have considered deception issues in
the context of antitrust cases have been reluctant to find
violations."" As one court said regarding claims of
disparagement of a rival, "[wihile false or misleading
advertising directed solely at a single competitor may not be
competition on the merits, the fliers in question must have a
significant and enduring adverse impact on competition itself
in the relevant markets to rise to the level of an antitrust
violation.""' Although there are few antitrust cases that rest
on deception claims, the courts typically follow an approach
similar to that of the Second Circuit, which applies a
presumption that false advertising's "effect on competition" is
de minimis.'4 2 In National Association of Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers, Inc. v. Ayerst Laboratories, the Second Circuit
adopted the Areeda treatise's suggestion that "a plaintiff may
overcome the de minimis presumption 'by cumulative proof
that the representations were [11 clearly false, [2] clearly
material, [31 clearly likely to induce reasonable reliance, [4]
made to buyers without knowledge of the subject matter, [51
continued for prolonged periods, and [6] not readily susceptible
of neutralization or other offset by rivals.""
philips-v-sk-kasetten-frand.html. But under European competition law, high prices can be
abuses of a dominant position, while in the U.S. only exclusionary conduct constitutes
monopolization. Communication from the Commission-Guidance on the Commission's
Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary
Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45) 7, 8; Herbert Hovenkamp, The
Monopolization Offense, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1035, 1036 (2000); see also infra note 158 and
accompanying text.
139. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting
Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1903-06 (2002).
140. Maurice E. Stucke, How Do (and Should) Competition Authorities Treat a
Dominant Firm's Deception?, 63 SMU L. REV. 1069, 1083-85 (2010).
141. Am. Profl Testing Serv., Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Profl
Publ'ns, Inc., 108 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997).
142. Nat'l Ass'n of Pharm. Mfrs., Inc. v. Ayerst Labs., 850 F.2d 904, 916 (2d Cir.
1988).
143. Id. (quoting 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION [ 738a (1978)).
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Application of this test to the standard-setting context
requires some adaptation. The first four criteria are directly
applicable, but the fifth and sixth, which seem related, do not fit
easily in the standard-setting context. Because the standard-
setting process takes place over a limited period of time, the
deceptive conduct need only be maintained during that period,
and once the standard is adopted, the effect of the deception is
difficult or impossible to "neutralize." As the Third Circuit said in
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc. regarding deception before a
standard-setting organization, it is during "the critical
competitive period that precedes adoption of a standard" that
"[misrepresentations concerning the cost of implementing a
given technology may confer an unfair advantage and bias the
competitive process in favor of that technology's inclusion in the
standard."'"
It is clear, in any event, that at least in some of these cases
the effect of the deception is far from de minimis. Hence, the
Third Circuit in Qualcomm adopted a test directed particularly
to the operation of standards-development organizations (SDOs):
We hold that (1) in a consensus-oriented private
standard-setting environment, (2) a patent holder's
intentionally false promise to license essential proprietary
technology on [fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, or
FRANDI terms, (3) coupled with an SDO's reliance on that
promise when including the technology in a standard, and
(4) the patent holder's subsequent breach of that promise, is
actionable anticompetitive conduct.4 1
The court concluded, therefore, that the allegations of deception
in that case were sufficient to state an antitrust claim, on
something akin to breach-of-contract theory,"' but not all courts
have reached similar results.
B. Power from Deception or Power from Patents?
Although the Third Circuit in Qualcomm addressed the
deception issue, not all courts have done so. The courts that have
rejected antitrust claims regarding deception during standard-
setting have generally done so by not confronting the deception
issues directly, instead focusing exclusively on the existence of
144. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 313 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations
omitted).
145. Id. at 314.
146. Presumably because antitrust does not have a well-developed analytical
approach to deception, the court turned to contract, or at least to "promise," for its test.
See infra text accompanying notes 159-162.
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patents. A particularly clear example was the district court
decision in Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc. that was reversed
by the Third Circuit:
Qualcomm has a legal monopoly over the technology
claimed in its patents. The incorporation of Qualcomm's
WCDIVIA patents into the UMTS standard does not make
Qualcomm an unlawful monopolist in the WCDMA
technology market. To conclude otherwise would subject
every firm with patents incorporated into an industry
standard to antitrust liability, and eliminate the
procompetitive benefits a SDO is designed to facilitate.
When an SDO decides to incorporate one company's
patented technology into a standard, the company holding
the incorporated patents will be in a position to control that
technology's distribution. Qualcomm's "power" to control
the licensing of its patents is derived from the rights it
enjoys as a patent-holder. The adoption of an industry
standard neither diminishes nor augments this
exclusionary right. 47
These statements are correct as far as they go, but they
completely ignore the key point, which is the patentee's increased
power created by its deception.
There are in fact three factors at play: the patentee's
exclusive rights, the additional power provided by the adoption of
the standard, and the patentee's deceptive conduct regarding
whether it would exercise that power. The court is correct that
Qualcomm had a legal monopoly, and it is correct that adoption
of the standard did not alter that exclusionary right. However,
Qualcomm had committed to license its technology on FRAND
terms,48 which was a voluntary relinquishment of its right to
exercise whatever power the standardization would provide. The
court dismissed the significance of this rationale:
The Court recognizes that Qualcomm's alleged
"inducement" of the SDO may be considered
anticompetitive conduct in the sense that a false promise
biased the SDO in Qualcomm's favor, to the detriment of
those patent-holders competing to have their patents
incorporated into the standard. The elimination of
competition in the WCDMA technology market, however,
would result regardless of how the SDO decided which
patents would comprise the standard. While Qualcomm's
behavior may have influenced how the SDO would eliminate
147. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 05-3350 (MLC), 2006 WL 2528545 at *9
(D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2006), rev'd, 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007).
148. Id. at *2.
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competition, it is the SDO's decision to set a standard for
WCDMA technology, not Qualcomm's "inducement," that
results in the absence of competing WCDMA technologies.
Qualcomm's alleged inducement by false promise may give
rise to a cause of action based on another legal theory, but
they do not provide an antitrust cause of action.149
The problem here is that the court is confusing a patent's
legal "monopoly" with monopoly power. Monopoly power is the
ability to charge supracompetitive prices, not the fact of being
the only game in town. By making the FRAND commitment,
Qualcomm denied itself the right to charge other than FRAND
prices and thus voluntarily ceded the power that the standard
provided. Moreover, it was the pre-standardization
competition, acknowledged by the court,'s that forced
Qualcomm to make that commitment. It is true that the patent
right and the standard eliminate post-standardization
competition (in the sense of rivalry among competitors), but it
was Qualcomm's pre-standardization deceptive conduct that
gave it a monopoly in the economic sense. The court seems to
have been confused by the existence of a patent, and the
exclusive right that it provides, and as a result neglected the
central issue of deception.
As noted above, the district court decision in Qualcomm was
reversed, but a year after that reversal, a similar approach was
taken in Rambus Inc. v. FTC, where the D.C. Circuit reversed
the FTC's condemnation of Rambus's failure to disclose.'5' The
FTC had concluded that if Rambus had disclosed its patent
position to the standard-setting organization, JEDEC, there
would have one of two results: "JEDEC either would have
excluded Rambus's patented technologies from the JEDEC
DRAM standards, or would have demanded RAND assurances,
with an opportunity for ex ante licensing negotiations."" The
court rejected the first of these alternatives because the
Commission conceded that it could not prove that another
technology would have been chosen.m
The court also rejected the second possibility because, it
said, "an otherwise lawful monopolist's use of deception simply to
obtain higher prices normally has no particular tendency to
149. Id. at *9.
150. Id.
151. Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
152. Opinion of the Commission (Public Record Version], In re Rambus, Inc., No.
9302, at 74 (F.T.C. July 31, 2006), quoted in Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 461 (D.C.
Cir. 2008).
153. Rambus, 522 F.3d at 464.
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exclude rivals and thus to diminish competition.'"" That may be
true of deception that is directed at customers, but it is not true
in this context. The problem here is a failure to acknowledge the
way in which information is important in standards competition.
That failure is odd given the court's willingness to acknowledge
the possibility that Rambus was able to use deception to obtain
higher prices."' If the higher post-standardization prices did not
result from exclusion of some alternative technology, then one
wonders how they were obtained. That is, if no alternative
technologies were available in the standard-setting process,
Rambus could have disclosed its patent position, stated that it
would charge the profit-maximizing price, and the standard-
setting organization would have had no choice but to accept those
terms.
It is true, as the court said, that the higher prices charged by
Rambus did not exclude competition in the post-standard
world,' but those higher prices were the result of the
exclusionary effect in the standard-setting process. And it is not
the case that only competitive effects resulting from current
exclusion are of concern. Consider predatory pricing. There, the
below-cost prices in the predatory-pricing period injure
competition by excluding competitors.' Then, in the recoupment
period, the higher prices are imposed.' In the recoupment
period, the higher prices do not, of course, cause further
exclusion; they are the product of the exclusion in the predatory
period. But we do not thereby dismiss the harm in the
recoupment period as a matter of no concern.
A closer analogy, perhaps, is that of post-contractual holdup.
In a variety of markets, such as those involving franchising,'
parties enter into contractual relationships that prompt
relationship-specific investments by one or both parties.
Generally speaking, the parties cannot fully protect themselves
by contract from exploitation by the other party in these
relationships, so they are vulnerable to post-contractual
154. Id.
155. See id. at 464-67.
156. Id. at 466.
157. Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing:
Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEo. L.J. 2239, 2242-43 (2000).
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Franchise Cases in the Wake of
Kodak. Applying Post-Contract Hold-Up Analysis to Vertical Relationships, 67 ANTITRUST
L.J. 283, 286-87 (1999); Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of
Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 345, 356 (1985).
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holdup.'60 In some cases, such holdup prompts antitrust claims.'!"
The courts' treatment of such claims generally turns on the pre-
contractual availability of information and the effectiveness of
pre-contractual competition. Even those who are generally
skeptical of such claims acknowledge that the pre-contractual
absence of information-and, presumably a fortiori, pre-
contractual deception--can create post-contractual power that is
subject to antitrust scrutiny."
One might acknowledge all this, yet wonder what it has to
do with patent law. The answer comes in considering why the
court overlooked the effect of Rambus's deception. The case in
fact is very similar to United States v. Microsoft Corp., in which
the same court, the D.C. Circuit, reached the opposite conclusion
regarding exclusionary conduct.' One of the allegations against
Microsoft was that it had engaged in deceptive conduct that
contributed to its monopoly power.m Bruce Kobayashi and
Joshua Wright, who agree with the D.C. Circuit's reversal of the
FTC's decision in Rambus, nevertheless point out that it is hard
to reconcile the two decisions."6 In each case, the allegations are
of deceptive acquisition of monopoly power.
A likely explanation for the differing opinions is Rambus's
possession of a patent. The court, like the district court in
Qualcomm, seems to confuse possession of a patent with
inevitable possession of unlimited monopoly power. This is
evident in two respects. First, it places primary reliance on the
statement that "an otherwise lawful monopolist's use of deception
simply to obtain higher prices normally has no particular
tendency to exclude rivals and thus to diminish competition."' 6 It
is not at all clear, though, that Rambus was "an otherwise lawful
monopolist." As discussed above, a patent provides a legal
monopoly, but it does not necessarily create an economic one. In
Rambus, the FTC explained that there were multiple
160. Klein, supra note 159, at 302.
161. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 455-
56 (1992); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 310 (3d Cir. 2007).
162. See Klein & Saft, supra note 159, at 324-25. Klein argues that post-contractual
exploitation that involves only a price increase should generally be addressed through
contract law, rather than antitrust. See id. at 324-26. But Klein's preference for contract
over antitrust is based primarily on the fact that at least some price change is generally
foreseeable. Id. Active deception is not similarly foreseeable. In any event, cases of
deception in standard-setting are increasingly including claims for breach of contract.
163. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
164. Id. at 75-76.
165. See Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 138, at 469, 491-92.
166. Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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technologies competing to be the standard.' At that point,
Rambus's patent did not provide an economic monopoly. It was
only through the deception that led to adoption of its technology
in the standard that Rambus acquired its monopoly. In other
words, it was not a lawful monopolist, if "lawful" means that its
power was acquired through legitimate means.
Kobayashi and Wright make this point as well, focusing on
the Rambus court's reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in
NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc.' In NYNEX, the defendant
participated in a fraudulent scheme to overcharge its customers
by overpaying to a subcontractor, resulting in higher regulator-
approved rates, then receiving rebates from the subcontractor. 69
The plaintiff was a competitor of the subcontractor that lost
business, it alleged, because it refused to participate in the
scheme.' But there was no allegation that the deception
involved in the scheme gave NYNEX greater power, as
distinguished from allowing it to avoid regulatory supervision, as
Kobayashi and Wright emphasize:
If the FTC's theory depended on the proposition that a
lawful monopolist's deceit that raises prices is an antitrust
violation, the D.C. Circuit is certainly correct that the
proposition conflicts with NYNEX. Clearly, conduct by a
lawful monopolist that merely results in higher prices is
protected under both NYNEX and Trinko. However, for
NYNEX to apply to deception claims, it must be the case
that the patent holder is otherwise lawfully a monopolist at
the time it engages in the deceptive conduct. But this is not
the FTC's anticompetitive theory of patent holdup at all.'
As Kobayashi and Wright point out, the D.C. Circuit "does not
clearly articulate its view concerning the relationship between
NYNEX and conventional deceptive patent holdup theory-that
is, the defendant's deception results in the acquisition of
otherwise non-existing monopoly power and excludes alternative
technologies as a consequence."72
The court's attribution of Rambus's post-standardization
power to its patent is also evident in its apparent view that only
if unpatented technology had been adopted in the standard would
167. Id. at 459.
168. See Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 138, at 471 (citing NYNEX Corp. v. Discon,
Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998)).
169. NYNEX, 525 U.S. at 131-32.
170. Id. at 132.
171. Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 138, at 490.
172. Id. (emphasis added).
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competition have been preserved. It says that "if Rambus's
more complete disclosure would have caused JEDEC to adopt a
different (open, non-proprietary) standard, then its failure to
disclose harmed competition and would support a
monopolization claim.""' The limitation to "non-proprietary"
technologies suggests that the court believes that JEDEC's
adoption of any patented technology, whether Rambus's or
another's, would create an "otherwise lawful monopolist" for
which deception would be irrelevant. Once again, this neglects
the role that deception played in creating Rambus's monopoly
power, if not its monopoly-i.e., single-seller-market share.
It seems unlikely that the court would have taken the
same approach if Rambus's "monopoly" was not from a patent.
Suppose, for example, that a standard-setting organization
was choosing between several alternative minerals for a
standard, and one company, which owned all of the sources of
one of the minerals, monopolium (perhaps through different
companies, so that the unified ownership was not apparent),
did not reveal its complete control over monopolium despite a
requirement to do so. Then suppose that, after adoption of a
standard requiring the use of monopolium, the company
sought to charge a high price. Although it is possible that the
Rambus court would have said even under these circumstances
that the company was a "lawful monopolist" of monopolium, it
seems more likely that it would have recognized that it was
the company's deception, not its control over the mineral, that
had given it power.
In the standard-setting cases, then, although the courts
have not misapplied patent-law concepts like the "scope of the
patent," they seem to have misapplied the basic concept of
patent protection. It is not the case that a patent necessarily
produces an economic monopoly, as courts frequently point out
in other contexts. Patentees, like other sellers, can face
competition or can make commitments that limit their power.
Courts should give such competition and such commitments
the same effect in cases involving patents as they do in other
cases. Like information about the validity or existence of a
patent, information about the licensing plans of a patentee is
not information over which patent law grants exclusive
control, so the presence of a patent should not alter the
treatment of anticompetitive deception.
173. Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The patent-antitrust interface has changed, because the
ways in which patentees seek to extend their patent rights
beyond their technical contributions has changed. Formerly,
antitrust challenges to conduct by patentees usually involved
efforts by patentees to use their monopolies to gain advantages in
markets that were beyond the scope of their patent claims. Such
efforts posed problems for patent law and for antitrust, but both
bodies of law developed doctrines that addressed this sort of
"leveraging," generally by focusing on the patentee's technical
contribution and denying it the right to profit by forcing the
purchase of products beyond the scope of that contribution. This
doctrinal approach was buttressed by antitrust's application of
similar prohibitions against ties involving unpatented products.
In the three areas discussed in this Article, this technique is
not applicable. In these areas, the patentee does not seek to gain
power in other markets or over other products; it seeks instead to
use uncertainty to increase the power derived from its patent.
Potential competitors and licensees are forced to contend not only
with the patentee's exclusive rights to its technical contribution,
but also with uncertainty regarding the existence, boundaries, or
validity of those rights. By creating, maintaining, or exacerbating
this uncertainty, the patentee is able to increase its market
power.
Whereas with market-to-market leveraging, patent law
could turn to antitrust law's rules for distinguishing and
governing markets, antitrust law is as yet ill-equipped to deal
with informational issues. This Article does not propose specific
solutions to the problems it identifies, but it points out several
common features among the courts' misapplications of patent
law. Generally speaking, when a patentee seeks an advantage
from an absence of information about the existence or validity of
its rights, there is no reason to apply patent law at all, and courts
should simply apply the same rules that would apply in other
contexts. Doing so would recognize that although patent law
grants patentees exclusive rights over their technical
contributions, information about the existence and validity of
patent rights should remain in the public domain.
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